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The  energy  crisis of the  United  States  is  often  dated from the
price  increase  and  embargo  imposed  by  the  Organization  of Pe-
troleum  Exporting  Countries  (OPEC)  in  October  1973,  followed
by the  massive  price  increase  in January  1974.  This  view  of the
energy world,  however,  is misleading.  In fact,  an energy  problem
for the  United  States  began  emerging  in  the mid-1960's  and  had
reached very significant proportions by the summer of 1973.  By the
mid-1960's,  the new findings of natural gas had fallen below annual
production,  and  the  reserve  base  for  interstate  gas  began  to  de-
cline;  air pollution  regulations,  imposed  primarily  on  the Eastern
Seaboard  but also  in  the  Midwest,  began  to force  coal  out of the
electric  utility  market  and  increased  markedly  the  demand  for
low-sulfur  fuel  oil;  and  excess  capacity  in  crude  oil  production,
which  had been a characteristic  of the U.S.  industry  since the  late
1920's,  began to  disappear.
By  1970  the  situation  had  turned  from  a  position  of energy
self-sufficiency  to one of dependence  upon overseas  imports in the
petroleum area.  This shift  in position was accelerated  by the step-
up  in  the rate  of demand  for total energy  relative  to GNP, which
became  evident  about  1965.  Several  factors  contributed  to  the  in-
creased  rate  of  energy  demand.  First,  the  rate  of  increase  in
efficiency  of  electric  power  generation  slowed,  and  continued
growth of the  industry  required increasing  gross  energy  inputs by
the  economy.  Second,  the growth  of automobile  accessories  and
the  imposition  of  pollution  standards  accelerated  the  decline  in
miles  per  gallon  for  the  average  car.  Third,  the  proliferation  of
appliances  and central  air conditioning  in  homes added  to  energy
demand.  The  increased  demand  was  concentrated  on oil,  accen-
tuating the decline  in  excess  capacity.
On the  supply side,  a number of factors reduced the  growth of
new producing capacity, both at the primary fuel and at the refinery
level.  These  factors  included  the  decline  in drilling  in the  United
States  for oil  and gas;  the  moratorium  on  outer continental  shelf
leasing; the National  Environmental  Protection  Act requirements,
which  greatly  slowed the  development  of the Trans-Alaska  pipe-
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cerning  import policy for petroleum.
The situation was recognized  and led  to a Presidential  message
on energy  in  the  summer  of 1971.  The  discussions  that  followed
concerning  approaches  to  the  energy  situation  led to  the  breeder
reactor program and a modest acceleration  of fossil  fuel  research.
By the  beginning  of  1973  the  situation  was  reaching  a critical
stage,  accentuated  by  price  controls.  The  Administration  ap-
pointed the first of its energy czars  in the  spring of that year. There
were  spot shortages  of gasoline  in  such  places  as  Denver and  the
Pacific  Northwest  in  the  summer  of  1973.  Major  studies  were
under way  within  the federal  government  in  August  1973  on  man-
datory allocation  systems  for fuel  oil  for the  coming  winter.  The
point is that,  while the OPEC price  increases  and  embargo  were a
major  shock  to  the  energy  system,  the  energy  problem  existed
before that and  has roots much deeper than just a cartel action  by a
group of oil  producers  in  the world.
This  paper  will  state  and analyze  current  issues  in energy  pol-
icy.  The  first  major section  will  review the  reaction  to the OPEC
embargo  and  price  increases.  The  second  section  will  critically
examine  the  policies  proposed  by  the  President  and  as  they  are
emerging  from  Congress.  The  third  section  will  discuss  related
major  policy  areas,  and  the  final  section  presents  the  author's
energy  policy  position.
REACTION  TO  OPEC
The  OPEC  crisis  found  the  energy  policy  mechanism  of the
federal  government  in  disarray.  There  had  been  a  succession  of
energy leaders-from  Flanigan to Erlichman to DiBona to Love to
Simon-in  the  previous  year.  Voluntary  allocation  programs  to
handle  the  shortages  were  in  effect,  but  neither the  Congress  nor
the  Administration  was  satisfied  with  the  existing  policy  struc-
ture.
The  first  reaction  to  the  embargo  was  an  allocation  system,
placed  in  the  Department  of the  Interior,  with  an expanded  staff
under the Office of Oil and Gas.  Initially the organization  was to be
staffed with executive  reservists  from the petroleum industry,  who
had  been  maintained  in  standby  capacity  since  World War  II  for
precisely  such  an emergency.  Conflict  of interest  questions  were
immediately raised and, as a result, the staff of the initial effort  had
to  be  federal  civil  servants  rather  than  knowledgeable  industry
people.  This  led to  a chaotic  situation.
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lished by  executive  order in  early December  1973,  in an  effort to
straighten out the mess. This office took over the petroleum alloca-
tion responsibilities  and much of the authority  which resided in the
Department  of the  Interior.  The  Federal  Energy  Office  was  suc-
ceeded  by  the  Federal  Energy  Administration,  established  by
Congress  as a temporary  agency to deal  with energy.  Late  in  1974
Congress  established  the  Energy  Resources  Council,  a  statutory
organization  in the White House. The Secretary of the Interior was
placed  in charge of the  Energy  Resources Council but,  in fact, the
Director of the  Federal  Energy  Administration  appears  to  be the
main driving force  on energy  within  the  Administration.
The reaction to the embargo and price crisis has been threefold.
First,  allocations  have  been  used  to  distribute  scarce energy  sup-
plies,  but  the  authority  for  mandatory  allocation  died  with  the
President's  veto  of the  extension  of the  emergency  energy  act.
Second,  efforts have  been  made to  increase  the domestic produc-
tion of energy.  These  involve  rapid acceleration  of leasing on the
outer continental  shelf, congressional  action to authorize the build-
ing  of the Trans-Alaska  pipeline,  and  a  massive  injection  of  re-
search  and  development  funds  into  alternative sources  and  forms
of energy.  Third, there has been  much talk and some action on the
conservation  of energy.  Daylight savings  time  was  imposed year-
round,  a  nationwide  speed  limit  of  55  miles  per hour  was  estab-
lished,  and  public  relations  campaigns  on  energy  conservation
were instituted.
Backing up the federal  allocation  system,  many  states adopted
measures to distribute gasoline supplies  more equitably.  Even-odd
systems  were  instituted  during  the  spring  of  1974,  and  Sunday
closings of gasoline  stations  were  very widespread.
The  price  increase  of OPEC  oil  caused  major dislocations  in
the  international  monetary  area.  The  International  Energy
Agency,  formed  with the  strong urging  of the  United States,  has
begun  to  react  with  a  common  consumer  point  of  view  to  the
OPEC cartel.  France  is the  only major free-world  industrial  coun-
try which has refused to join the  IEA. The  International Monetary
Fund  has approved  the  safety net proposal  of a revolving  fund for
borrowing to handle balance-of-payments  deficits arising from oil.
Consumption  of energy  in  1974  in  the  United  States  actually
declined, but during the first eight months of 1975,  demand for coal
and oil started to rise again.  It is not clear whether the decline  was
a  response to high  prices of energy,  to energy conservation,  or to
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very  substantial  increases  in  world  petroleum  reserves.  Today,
production in the petroleum exporting  countries  is some 30 percent
lower than  capacity.  Stocks  in  the  United  States  are  high  for  all
petroleum  products.  There are  some  indications of price cutting in
the  Middle  East  oil  markets,  and  some  analysts  are  predicting  a
crude  petroleum  price  collapse  within  the next  several  years.
ENERGY  POLICY  PROPOSALS
The Administration's Program
In January  1975,  President  Ford submitted to Congress a com-
plex energy  program.  His  energy  program  was tied directly  to his
economic  program,  and  President  Ford  has  insisted  on this  rela-
tionship.
The goals of the Administration's energy program are to reduce
imports by 1 million barrels per day by the end of 1975,  by 2 million
barrels a day by the end of 1977,  and to a level of 5 million barrels  a
day by  1985.  Reduction  in consumption is to be achieved  by higher
prices for energy. The  1985 target level of imports is to be achieved
by a combination  of reduced  consumption  and increased domestic
supply.
To implement  this  program,  the  President  has  announced  im-
port  fees  on  imported  crude  oil  and  products  equivalent  to  two
dollars  per  barrel.  Congress  passed  legislation  to  postpone  this
import fee  increase,  but was unable to override a presidential  veto
of this legislation.  (A federal  appeals court has found that the  Pres-
ident  exceeded  his  authority  in  levying the  import fee.  That deci-
sion  is on appeal  in the  Supreme  Court.)
The President announced  his intention to decontrol  the price of
old oil in the United States in the spring of 1975.  He delayed, at the
urging  of  Congress,  and  submitted  for  consideration  several  al-
ternatives  to  complete  decontrol.  Congress  passed  a  simple  ex-
tension  of the  price  control-allocation  act.  When  this  authority
expires,  the price  of oil  will  be  completely  decontrolled,  and  the
President  will have  no  allocation  authority.
The major items of the President's program which require legis-
lative action include a windfall profits tax for crude  oil  and natural
gas,  natural gas price  deregulation,  excise  taxes on  petroleum and
natural gas, opening up of naval petroleum reserves for production,
forced  conversion  of  electric  utilities  to  domestic  coal,  and  a
strategic  storage  system  for  petroleum.  The  President  is  also re-
questing  standby  authorities  for  rationing  and  allocation  of  pe-
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cluded  in  the  program  is  a  group  of bills  relating  to  the  electric
utility industry.  These  relate to the pass-through of fuel costs,  tax
treatment  of investment and preferred  stock dividends,  and expe-
dited  licensing  and siting  of nuclear facilities.
Critique of the  Administration's Program
The Administration's  program  quite  obviously  has  several  ob-
jectives.  The  import  fee  proposal  and  the heavy  excise  taxes  on
petroleum  and  natural  gas  are  aimed  at  increasing  the  price  of
energy in order to reduce consumption.  However,  the other half of
the supply-demand  mechanism  is supply response to higher prices,
which would help mitigate the price rise and help achieve  the  1985
objective.
On  the  supply  side,  this  program  takes  away  the  incentives.
The excise tax plus a windfall  profits tax would prevent the higher
prices implied by tariffs and price decontrol actions from serving as
an incentive  for increasing  domestic  production.  It must be noted
that the program also includes the establishment of floor prices for
new energy sources.  Conflicting signals are coming from the Inter-
national  Energy  Agency  and  the  Administration.  While  the  Ad-
ministration  has opted  for high  energy  prices  to reduce  consump-
tion,  it  has not  opted  to  allow  these  high  energy  prices  to  go  to
producers  in the form of higher returns  to increase  supply.
There  is  no  clear justification  of the  necessity  of meeting  the
Administration's  short-term  goals  of reducing  petroleum  imports
by  1 million barrels  per day  by the  end of this  year and  2  million
barrels  per day by  1977.  Such a reduction  could very  well deepen
the  current  recession.  There  is  a  rising  chorus  from  critics  who
argue  that nothing  is to be  gained by  such  a drastic  reduction.
Other areas of criticism of the program lie with the tying together
of the  economic  issues  and  the  energy  problem.  The  proposed
program  would  involve  a  massive  increase  in  federal  revenues,
which  would be distributed  back to the economy through  tax cuts
and  other payments.  It  is  not  clear  that  the  income  distribution
problem and the recession problem are integral parts of the energy
problem. There are interactions between them, and the President's
approach  of reducing  energy  consumption  by  higher  prices  em-
phasizes  these interactions.  Nevertheless,  the  petroleum  and fuel
bill for the  United  States  is  still a  relatively  minor  part of GNP.
The issues  in the economic  area are different,  complex,  and highly
important.  The  forced consideration  of joint policies  does not  ap-
pear  to be either  necessary  or wise.
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It is trite to say that Congress  does not speak  in one voice.  The
Democratic  leadership  of the House and the Senate are attempting
to  develop  a  joint  energy  program  as  an  alternative  to  the
Administration's  program.  What  will  finally  result  from congres-
sional  action  is  not  at  all  clear.  There  is  no  congressional  energy
program.  Some  elements  appear  to  be  consensus  items,  such  as
limited reduction of imports,  forced conservation,  federal explora-
tion of federally owned  resources,  continued  price  controls  on old
oils,  and  the  use of import  quotas  rather than tariffs.  These  arise
from the joint efforts of House and Senate committees.  However,
the  organization  of Congress,  which  brings many committees  into
the  energy  picture,  makes  the  development  of a  comprehensive
and  consistent  program  by  Congress  extremely  difficult.
Earlier  in  the  game  there  appeared  to  be  vocal  support  for
gasoline  rationing  as  an  alternative  to  higher  energy  prices.  Al-
though this idea is  still being pushed,  at least on a standby basis,  in
the  Senate,  support  for  it  as  an  immediate  action  has  obviously
declined.
Critique of Congressional  Energy  Proposals
Congress appears  to be moving away from the price  system as
the  main  mechanism  to  achieve  energy  sufficiency.  They  wish to
concentrate  the energy conservation  measures on gasoline, appar-
ently on the ground  that gasoline  consumption has  higher elements
of social  waste  than other  energy  consumption.  They  accept  tax
incentives  for  conservation  of  energy  in  other  forms,  such  as
home  insulation, and they intend to use the tax system to penalize
heavy  gas-consuming  cars.  But  the  basic  thrust  is  clearly  not
across-the-board  energy conservation,  but energy conservation di-
rected primarily to the automobile. The difficulty with this position
is  that  there  is  less  elasticity  in  gasoline  demand  than  there  is  in
other sectors of energy  consumption.
On the  supply  side,  Congress  appears  to be moving  to change
the economic institutions surrounding energy. The call for a federal
energy  corporation  is  a  move  toward  social  direction  of  future
energy  production,  and  away from our tradition of private  sector
exploitation of publicly owned  resources.
Perhaps most difficult of all to deal  with is  congressional  rejec-
tion of the  price  system as  a regulator of energy  supply.  It is  very
clear that the  Senate  is  not happy  with the deregulation  of natural
gas.  It  is  equally  clear  that  there  is  considerable  pressure  from
Congress  to  maintain  price controls  on old crude  oil.
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In order to get a little bit of organization  into the chaos,  in this
section  six major energy policy issues will be discussed. These are:
(1) reduced consumption,  (2)  import reduction,  (3) pricing of fuels,
(4)  supply  augmentation,  (5)  environmental  questions,  and  (6)
utility  problems.
Reduced  Consumption
At issue in consumption  reduction is the question of how much,
how soon,  and the means to achieve whatever goal is established.
The  President's  goals  apparently  have  no  analytical  basis.  It
cannot be demonstrated that national  security against an Arab em-
bargo would be increased  by an immediate substantial reduction of
consumption,  nor can the optimum path of such reduction through
time  be identified.
Congress  wants  to  concentrate  reduced  consumption  in  the
area of gasoline,  whereas  the President's  program  spreads  across
all sectors  by increasing the price of crude oil,  petroleum products,
and natural  gas to the U.S.  economy.
When a consumption  target is established, it can be achieved  by
rationing  at the end-use  level,  or by allocation  to the distributors'
level.  Both  rationing  and  allocation  have  been  used  historically
-rationing  in  World  War  II,  and  allocation  on  a  voluntary  and
mandatory basis  since  1973  in the United States.  The major prob-
lems in both  the rationing  and allocation  schemes  have to  do with
the  equity  issue-who  shall  give  up  consuming-and  with  the
bureaucratic  burden of the programs.  An end-use rationing system
would be  extremely  expensive  to  administer and  would  lead to  a
widespread black  market and cheating.  Also the decisions  on who
would get what are very difficult to make on any nationwide  basis.
The  problem is  substantially  greater than it was in  World War II.
The number  of cars  is  much  greater,  and  society,  in  a locational
sense,  is  now built around the automobile.  The allocation  system
simply  hides  these  problems  by  placing  the  burden  for  end-use
rationing on the fuel distributor, and it is much easier to administer.
Another  method  of reducing  consumption  is  through  a  com-
prehensive  set  of  regulations  with  regard  to  energy  consuming
technologies.  These regulations  could range  all the way from insu-
lation  standards  in  new  and  old  buildings  to  required  gasoline
mileage  in  automobiles.  Certain  regulations  are  almost  noncon-
troversial,  but  others  raise  very  serious  questions  concerning
economic  efficiency  and consumer choice.
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consumption.  These  could be  in  the form of tax penalties  on low
economy  cars  or tax benefits  for insulating buildings.  The tax  sys-
tem is a sensitive tool to achieve other than revenue  ends, but it is a
very cumbersome  tool.
The fundamental  issue,  then, in  consumption reduction  is how
much should it be reduced by direct  societal action, and when that
is  answered,  how  should  society  achieve  the  goal  that  is  estab-
lished?
Import Reduction
The  primary  U.S.  imports  of energy are  crude  oil  and  related
products,  although there  are small  imports of coal  and natural gas.
The policy issue here  is the level of petroleum  imports. The major
questions  are:  Should  imports be  held at a  stated level,  or should
they be allowed to flow in response to  market mechanisms;  and,  if
they are  to be reduced  by interference  in the marketplace,  should
that  reduction  be accomplished  by quotas  or tariffs?
With respect  to  the  first question,  the  argument  for import  re-
duction rests  on a national  security base.  It  is  argued that  imports
of petroleum  from  the  petroleum  exporting  countries  must be  re-
duced to prevent  the United States from becoming subject to polit-
ical blackmail.  However, the alternative of strategic storage, rather
than import reduction,  should be seriously considered.  The import
reduction  alternative  would  deny  the economy  oil now  as a  price
for  being  protected  from  not  having  future  oil.  The  cost  of  im-
mediate  import  reduction,  especially  in an economy  which  is  un-
healthy, would be great.  The issue is: Must a quantitative  target for
import  reduction  be set  and achieved  regardless  of cost?
Looking  at  means  of import  reduction,  the  alternatives  avail-
able are  quotas or tariffs.  Quotas  have the  advantage  of establish-
ing  a  precise  quantitative  target  which  will  not  be  exceeded,  and
the economic  consequences of this reduction will be handled  sepa-
rately. The tariff system,  on the other hand,  has major advantages
administratively, but has the disadvantage  of not establishing a firm
quantitative  level  of imports.  Both  systems  would  operate  to  in-
crease the  price  of crude  oil  in the  United  States.
Pricing
The  pricing  issues  relate  to  whether  the  prices  of domestic
sources  will  be  allowed  to  rise  to  the  import  price,  and  will  be
controlled  by the  import  price.  New oil has been  in that situation,
as  has  coal.  However,  natural  gas  is  controlled  by  the  Federal
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gust 31.  Decontrol of natural gas and old oil  will increase the aver-
age price  paid  by consumers in the United States; however,  it  will
have a concurrent effect of increasing the incentives  for expanding
domestic  supply.  This  is the crux of the  pricing  issue.  Both  Con-
gress  and the President seem to be opting for high-cost  energy for
conservation  reasons, but they differ on whether the higher prices
should go to the government to be redistributed  through the federal
budget,  or to  industry  as an incentive  for increasing  supply.
Note that the United States  seems to be in a "Catch-22"  situa-
tion with respect to pricing-the policy is to raise prices  in order to
lower  prices.  Mr.  Kissinger  is  urging  a  floor price  (he  has  never
said  how  high)  to  protect  domestic  investments  in  alternative
energy  supplies.  It  would  seem  much  simpler  to  allow domestic
prices  to  rise to import  prices,  and  let the  cartel  understand  that
their current prices  are too high to sustain their markets  in the long
run.  Why protect  now against predatory  price cutting when action
in  response  to  such cutting,  such  as  a tariff or selective  subsidy,
can  be imposed  when  the time comes?
Supply  Augmentation
If the  pricing  system  were  used  as  the  supply  regulator,  the
current  high  prices  of oil,  coal,  and  natural  gas  (decontrolled)
would  stimulate  additional  production.  To give  supply augmenta-
tion a chance to work,  federally owned  resources  must be opened
to exploitation.  This means  a very  rapid development  of the outer
continental  shelves  for oil  and gas,  and  the  opening  of the  major
coal reserves  west of the Mississippi  to use.  In addition,  efforts  to
develop synthetic gas from coal and improved nuclear technologies
and  perhaps  extraction  from  oil  shale  will  provide  new  supply
sources  in the  1990's.
At  issue  here  is  the  method  of developing  federal  energy  re-
sources.  Should  they  be  federally  financed  and  controlled,  or
should the  private sector provide  the new  supplies of energy?  Ob-
viously the result is  going to be some  mix.  The traditional mix has
been  federal  government  research  and  development  but  private
industry  investments  in productive capacity  and  production.
Environment
The issues about the  environment lie  in two areas-regulations
with  respect  to  the  automobile  and those  with  respect  to  mining
and  burning  of coal.  There  are  very  substantial  questions  about
how  much control  is  required  to  meet  the secondary  health  stan-
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tion is  before Congress  to delay the imposition of these secondary
standards, and also to delay the imposition of the emission controls
on automobiles. This  issue is one that raises major scientific ques-
tions concerning  the current  state of knowledge  in the area,  major
technological  issues,  and major  public  policy  issues  on  the  trade-
offs  between  energy consumption  and environmental  damages.
Utility  Problems
There are major problems  with the  siting of utility plants,  espe-
cially  nuclear,  and  the  difficulty  of financing  expansions  in  utility
capacity.  These  problems  can  be  handled  legislatively,  through
something  like  the  land  use  and  energy  siting  bill  that  has  been
before  Congress.  On  the  financing  side,  they can  be  handled  by
changes  in rate  structures such  as marginal  cost pricing and allow-
ances  of rates of return  adequate  to  attract the  necessary  capital.
A  POLICY POSITION
There  is no  obvious  "right"  energy  policy.  What  is  indicated
here are  five  basic postures  which could serve  as a policy position
in this  most difficult  area.
1.  Do  not  impose  lnei  additional  taxes  or  tariffs  to  raise  the
cost  of energy  above  that established  by  the  OPEC  cartel.  The
justification  of this position lies  in the fact that there appears  to be
no gain  to national security  from an immediate  forced reduction in
consumption.  There  is  no  immediate  reason  to  impose additional
burdens  on the  economy,  or  to  undertake  massive  income  pass-
through  operations  in the  federal  budget,  in  order to  reduce  con-
sumption.  The best  short-run  policy seems  to be to let  the  market
system alone  and  see what happens.
2.  Deregulate  domestic  energy  prices.  Price  regulation  im-
poses  major distortions  on the  economy.  Energy  supply  will  not
increase  if prices  are  regulated.  Only  if there  is  no  elasticity  in
domestic  energy  supply  does the  argument  for price regulation  to
ration existing supplies make  sense.  The supply elasticity question
cannot  be answered  definitively,  but the  weight  of the  evidence  is
that substantial supply elasticity does exist.  The cost of testing that
hypothesis  is  less  than  the  cost  of  not  exploring  the  avenue  of
additional  supply.
3.  Long-run  supplies  should  be  augmented  by  federal  action.
The federal augmentation of long-run supplies should take the form
of opening  up  federal  resources  for exploitation,  relaxation  of en-
vironmental  standards,  the  use of coal  in  the electric  power field,
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sources  of energy.
4.  Undertake  strategic storage for national security. No supply
augmentation  program  and  no  forced  conservation  program  can
protect the nation against a boycott by oil exporting countries for at
least the next five  years. The only answer to the boycott problem is
sufficient  storage  to  allow the  United  States  to  impose  allocation
and rationing  systems,  if required,  in face  of a supply cutoff.  The
President has  suggested that a billion  barrels of oil (about 3 million
barrels  per day for a  year)  is  an adequate  supply  for that purpose.
In  addition,  the  armed  forces  will  need  oil  in  storage  at  bases
throughout the  world,  and the figure  placed on that by the  Presi-
dent  is  300  million  barrels.
Such  storage targets should be immediately  implemented.  With
price  decontrol  of domestic sources,  there  will  be  no price  differ-
ence  between the domestic  oil and imported  oil.  As  supply elastic-
ity in imported oil is substantial, purchase of oil in open markets for
storage  should  seriously be considered  over the next year. This is
the  cheapest protection  against a  future boycott.
5.  Certain institutional actions  should be taken to  increase  the
efficiency  of energy use.  While opposing at this time forced reduc-
tion in energy  consumption,  several things can be done which  will
reduce  future  consumption  and  increase  efficiency,  but which  do
not incur major current costs to the total economy. Taxing high gas
consumption  automobiles,  encouraging  insulation of new  and  old
buildings,  requiring  labeling for energy efficiency on all appliances,
and providing federal  help in improving  transportation  systems all
are  actions  which  meet this  criterion.  These  actions  can  substan-
tially increase  efficiency  in  use of energy,  perhaps  even over and
above  that generated  by higher  prices  of energy.  Their imposition
would  not  increase  unemployment  or feed  inflation.  They  should
be urged.
CONCLUSION
This paper  has  reviewed  the recent history  in energy,  charac-
terized  and  critiqued  the  administration  and  congressional  posi-
tions,  identified  some  major  energy  policy  areas  and  the  issues
involved, and proposed  five principles for consideration  in the area
of energy  policy.
The biases of the paper are to use  the  price system  rather than
direct regulation,  to separate the energy policy from the rest of the
economic  and  social  policy  issues  that  beset  the  nation,  and  to
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sive energy costs for a long period of time. These biases flow from
an optimistic  view  of the  world's energy  resources.  The  world  is
not running out of energy.  If that  is so,  there should  be evolution-
ary  institutional  changes  which  will  handle  the  energy  problem.
There is  no need to abandon a free  society,  to drop the conception
of free world commodity interchange,  or lose the  American dream
of high  level  per capita income  and affluence.
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